close connection that exists between Part IV and the other parts of the cISG becomes particularly obvious when looking at Articles 12 and 96 cISG: These two provisions deal with exactly the same question in exactly the same way, but have (for no apparent reason 8 ) been placed into two separate parts of the convention. 9 When discussing 'Final Provisions', it is therefore always necessary to look at the subject matter of each individual provision, and not merely at their location in Part IV of the cISG.
This article provides an overview of the most important questions that Articles 89-101 cISG have raised, and in particular focuses on those issues that have been discussed by case law. 10 
InTerPreTATIon oF ArTIcLeS 89-101 cISG
In order to be able to deal with pertinent issues involving the convention's 'Final Provisions', it it is first necessary to determine which rules govern the interpretation of Articles 89-101 cISG.
Provisions Governing the Interpretation
In this respect, a number of different approaches have been advocated: While the majority of authors point to the public international law character of Part IV and argue that the applicable rules of interpretation are exclusively those provided for in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna convention on the Law of For a discussion of the drafting history see Schroeter, uG (2005) UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht -Verhältnis und Wechselwirkungen Sellier european Law Publishers at § 8 para 27.
9
Article 12 CISG is, strictly speaking, superfluous; see Herber, R and Czerwenka, B (1991) Internationales Kaufrecht c.H. Beck at Art 12 para 5; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 para 27; but see enderlein, F and Maskow, d (1992) International Sales Law oceana at Art 12 no. 2. 1. 10 note that the uncITrAL digest of case law on the united nations convention on the International Sales of Goods (published in 2004) does not cover the provisions in Part IV of the Convention. I have attempted to fill this gap by reviewing all relevant cases and arbitral awards listed in the Pace database (http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu): From a public international law perspective, Al's collection of case law on the cISG is reporting on decades of treaty practice. ties of 23 May 1969 (thereby excluding the application of Article 7(1) cISG to Articles 89-101 cISG), 11 others allow for a parallel application of Articles 31-33 convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 7(1) cISG. 12 It is submitted that the latter approach should be followed, as Article 7(1) cISG explicitly demands that '[i] n the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade ': 13 By using the term 'this convention', Article 7(1) cISG refers to the convention in its entirety (including its Part IV), as can be deduced from the terminology employed elsewhere in the CISG -whenever a CISG provision merely refers to a specific Part or individual article of the Convention, it specifically says so.
14 Accordingly, Article 7(1) cISG governs the interpretation of Articles 89-101 cISG, 15 thus eg allowing recourse to these provisions' legislative history in situations in which the more narrowly drafted rule in Article 32 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties would prohibit this step. The residuary rules in Articles 31-33 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties can, on the contrary, only be applied as far as their content is compatible with Article 7(1) cISG. Schroeter, uG (2004) ' The Status of Hong Kong and Macao under the united nations convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (16) Pace International Law Review 307 at 323, available at: http://www.schroeter.li/pdf/ Schroeter_16_Pace_Intl_L_rev_2004_307.pdf; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 para 31. 16 Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 8 para 32.
Language Versions of the Convention
A special question that may arise in the course of interpreting Part IV of the cISG is which language version of the provision should be looked to. Although often discussed in connection with Article 7(1) cISG, this issue is specifically addressed in the so-called 'Witness Clause' which concludes the Final Clauses of the CISG and specifies that (only) the Convention's texts in the six official languages of the United Nations -Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish -are 'equally authentic'.
This clause, which conforms to common treaty practice, should however not be taken at face value, because not all of the authentic language versions represent the decisions made by the convention's drafters in equal measure: the english language was the one primarily used during the discussions in Vienna and, maybe more importantly, the only language used by the diplomatic Conference's drafting committee which produced the final text of the provisions. 17 The convention's english text version should therefore, in this author's opinion and based on Article 7(1) cISG, be accorded prevalence where it is in conflict with other language versions, 18 as the latter are sometimes not more than less-than-accurate translations of the english version. See Swiss Supreme court, 13 november 2003, available at: http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/031113s1.html holding that the english version, and, secondarily, the French version are to be given a higher significance as English and French were the official languages of the Conference and the negotiations were predominantly conducted in english; Brunner, c (2004) UN-Kaufrecht -CISG Stämpfli at 554; diedrich, F (1996) This lack of exactness has also been tacitly acknowledged by the depositary of the convention (Article 89 cISG), who in recent years has published rectifications of both the authentic Arabic and Russian text versions.
reSerVATIonS
Among the thirteen articles that make up Part IV of the convention, the majority lay down one and the same type of final clauses: reservations. According to the definition in Article 2(1)(d) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 'reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. tween enterprises situated in these States), Article 95 cISG (entitling States to declare that they will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG) and finally Article 96 cISG (authorizing States to exclude the application of the convention's provisions on freedom of form), with eleven reserving States the convention's most popular reservation. 24 Technical questions surrounding the making of declarations under the convention are governed by Article 97 CISG, and Article 98 CISG clarifies that no reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in the convention.
The fact that the convention allows for reservations at all has often been criticized for allegedly having both decreased uniformity and increased the likelihood of confusion regarding the application of the cISG. 25 What is certainly true is that it is not always easy to determine the precise effect that a given reservation has on the convention's practical application. The main difficulty results from the necessity to 'translate' a declaration under public international law -the reservation -into a language familiar to the commercial lawyers and judges entrusted with applying the cISG. As will be demonstrated in more detail below, most problems in this respect can be solved by staying true to the wording of the cISG's Final Provisions. This approach usually leaves no room for calling upon the (residuary!) rules in the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties which deal with reservations in general, 26 as these are being displaced by Articles 92-98 cISG. The divergence between the (significant) attention that certain reservations have received in scholarly writing and the (limited) importance they have gained in the convention's practical application is particularly striking when it comes to Article 95 cISG: While this provision has been scrutinized with a truly frightening thoroughness, its practical impact (on Article 1(1)(b) cISG) is diminishing by the day, since Article 1(1)(a) cISG has long become the by far more important basis for the convention's application. See Bridge The International Sale of Goods supra fn 26 at para 2.45: 'The Article 95 problem is a dying one, the victim of the success of the cISG...'. of the 'territorial unit' is provided for in the State's constitution itself, 31 while it is insufficient that the power to legislate on certain matters has merely been delegated to a territorial unit. This interpretation is supported by both purpose and legislative history of the provision, which was intended to enable a State to accede to the cISG with respect to individual units, even if it is unable to do so for all of its territorial divisions as it lacks competence over the legal matters governed by the cISG. 32 The relevant point in time is the moment the declaration is made, not the moment the convention enters into force for the declaring State. Accordingly, a declaration under Article 93 cISG can also be made if the prerequisites described above have only come into existence after the State had acceded to the convention, eg because of a change to its constitution or because the State extended its territory by way of an accession of new 'territorial units'. 35 The drafting history of Article 94 cISG provides no particular guidance either, as a variety of potentially covered cases were discussed: The most important one (and, indeed, the reason why the reservation had been developed in the first place) was the Nordic uniform sales law implemented by the Scandinavian States (which later became the only States to make use of Article 94 cISG), but an envisaged uniform sales law between the Benelux countries (which never materialized) and the closely related legal rules in Australia and new Zealand were also mentioned. 36 In the later academic discussion, Article 94 cISG was thought to be potentially applicable to the relationship between the united Kingdom and commonwealth countries which still have sales legislation modelled on the english Sale of Goods Act 37 as well as between canada and the united States, 38 but not to the countries belonging to the romanistic legal family (Italy, France and Spain).
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In the end, the line between (merely) related and 'closely' related legal rules remains difficult to draw. Article 94 CISG eventually provides little guidance in this respect. The preferable approach is therefore to accept that it is left to the States contemplating the reservation to decide for themselves 34 It is submitted that uniform law conventions -which are the most important (although not the only) source of uniform law -may prevail over the CISG by way of Article 90 cISG, but may similarly be covered by Article 94 cISG; see Bridge 'uniform and Harmonized Sales Law' supra fn 27 at para 16.126; enderlein and Maskow International Sales Law supra fn 9 at Art 94 no 1; Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 10 para 14. Assuming for the moment that the assessments reported are accurate, what are the consequences for the application of the convention? While it has been suggested that a reservation must be considered ineffective when its conditions are not satisfied (and should therefore be disregarded by the courts), 47 the opposing view seems to be correct: Article 97(4) cISG designates the (it is submitted, only) way by which a reservation's effect may be removed, ie through its withdrawal by a formal notification in writing addressed to the depositary. The procedure provided by Article 97(4) cISG thus precludes courts in the various contracting States from making their own (and possibly divergent) assessments about the compatibility of national laws with Articles 93, 94 and 96 CISG, and thereby avoids a significant legal uncertainty which might otherwise arise.
48

Time at which a Reservation may be made
The convention's reservations can be divided into two groups based on the time at which they may be declared: In accordance with the general rule laid down in Article 19 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, three reservations may only be made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (Articles 92, 93 and 95 cISG), while the cISG's drafters have generously allowed two others (Articles 94 and 96 cISG) to be made 'at any time'. Within their scope of application, Articles 94 and 96 CISG accordingly provide the Convention with a greater flexibility in dealing with future legal developments on a national or regional level, by leaving room for an increasing regional harmonization in matters of sales law (Article 94 cISG) 49 or for a later introduction of written form requirements into the domestic legislation of contracting States (Article 96 cISG).
50 This arguably is a very useful feature, as it allows the Convention -which has occasionally been criticized as resulting in a 'petrification' of the law of sales -to adopt to changing circumstances.
Legal Effects of Reservations made
Effect as to Subject Matter: Which of the Convention's Rules are Modified? aRTIcle 92 cIsg
The effect of an Article 92-reservation is to modify the application of the term 'contracting State' in both Articles 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) cISG: As, according to Article 92 (2) contracting State' within the meaning of Article 1(1) cISG, Article 1(1)(a) cISG cannot lead to the applicability of the cISG's rules where one of the parties to the sales contract has its place of business in the reserving State.
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The convention is furthermore not applicable by virtue of Article 1(1)(b) cISG when the private international law rules of the forum declare the law of the reserving State to be applicable to the contract. It should, however, be noted that the effect which an Article 92-reservation has on Article 1(1) cISG is limited in two respects:
First, the effect only extends to the Part of the cISG covered by the reservation made, ie either Part II (contract conclusion) or Part III (rights and obligations under a sales contract). If the reservation pertains to Part II (as all Article 92-reservations made until now do), it accordingly affects the applicability of Articles 14-24 cISG. But the reservation should, it is submitted, be read as also extending to any 'general principles' underlying Articles 14-24 cISG which, in accordance with Article 7(2) cISG, may be invoked eg where a contractual agreement has been reached without clearly identifiable elements of offer and acceptance.
52 (A German court, however, has ruled otherwise. pace.edu/cases/981027u1.html. But see oberlandesgericht naumburg (Germany), 27 April 1999, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990427g1.html: the convention was declared applicable to a contract between a danish seller and a German buyer by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) cISG, and Articles 14-19 cISG were applied in order to determine whether a contract had been concluded -the Danish Article 92 cISG-reservation was accordingly overlooked; oberlandesgericht Frankfurt (Germany), 4 March 1994, available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940304g1. html: Articles 14, 19 cISG were applied to a contract between a German seller and a Swedish buyer by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) CISG -the Swedish Article 92 CISGreservation was overlooked. ognizes the 'parol evidence rule', should this rule -which generally is inapplicable in cISG cases 54 -be applied to the contract formation at hand? The court answered in the negative and argued that the issue of parol evidence is addressed in Article 8 CISG, which -forming part of Part I of the CISG -remains unaffected by the declaration under Article 92 CISG; 55 a possible, but certainly not the only imaginable result. It is furthermore interesting to note that a State declaring that it will not be bound by Part II will apparently nevertheless be bound by Article 29 CISG (governing modifications of contract), as the latter provision is located in Part III of the cISG. This raises the question if an agreement under Article 29(1) cISG to modify, supplement or terminate a contract of sale will be subject to Articles 14-24 cISG, or if the reservation has to be read as also covering matters of contract modification. Second, it has to be kept in mind that an Article 92-reservation does not affect Article 1(1)(b) CISG in situations where the conflict of law rules point to the law of another contracting State, which has not made a reservation under Article 92 CISG -in these cases, the rules of the Convention have to be applied, 57 and at least one court in an Article 92 cISG-reserving State has done so. Bergsten, e (2008) 
aRTIcle 95 cIsg
The effect of a reservation under Article 95 cISG is to exclude the reserving State's duty under public international law to apply Article 1(1)(b) cISG. The wording of Article 95 CISG, which -couched in classical public international law terms -entitles any State to declare 'that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of this convention', makes amply clear that the application of Article 1(1)(a) cISG is e contrario not affected by the reservation: reserving States continue to be bound by this provision. 59 Apart from this indication, Article 95 cISG provides little guidance to courts and arbitrators when it comes to determining the reservation's exact effect on the Convention's practical application, as it lacks a specific paragraph dealing with this question comparable to the ones that Articles 92-94 cISG have been endowed with. This difference in drafting style can be traced back to Article 95 cISG's legislative history: The reservation was only included into the convention due to a last-minute decision in the Plenary conference, 60 which meant that its wording did not undergo extensive scrutiny in a drafting committee.
It is therefore not entirely surprising that different opinions have been advocated when it comes to the question whether the courts in a reserving State, even when -due to Article 95 CISG -not obliged to do so under public international law, are still entitled to apply the convention in cases in which the prerequisites of Article 1(1)(a) CISG are not fulfilled. The domestic law of one Article 95 CISG-reserving State -Singapore -contains a specific rule through which the national legislator has explicitly excluded the application of the cISG in all cases in which Article 1(1)(a) is inapplicable. See Sub-section 3(2) of the Singapore Sale of Goods (united nations convention) Act: 'Sub-paragraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of the convention shall not have the force of law in Singapore and accordingly the convention will apply to contracts of sale of goods only between those parties whose places of business are in different states when the States are contracting States'. have taken the same position and held that the only circumstance in which the cISG can be applied by a u.S. court is if all the parties to the contract are from contracting States. 62 It is, however, important to note that there is nothing in Article 95 cISG itself that would prevent a court in a reservation State from applying the cISG in cases in which its private international law (eg by honouring a choice of law clause forming part of the parties' contract) points to a law of a contracting State: Article 95 cISG in itself merely excludes the reserving State's obligation to do so, but leaves the ensuing question of how to determine the applicable law entirely to the domestic conflict of laws rules. 63 If these lead to the applicability of the Convention -as they well may 64 -this result is reached by way of the rules of private international law only, without Article 1 (1)(b) chinese respectively russian law to cISG contracts. It has furthermore been confirmed by a Russian court decision.
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The correct view, however, seems to be that the Article 96 cISG reservation merely excludes the ipso iure applicability of Article 11 cSG (and other provisions of the convention affecting formal requirements), but says nothing about the question which law will govern the formal validity of the parties' declarations: This matter is rather left for the private international law rules of the forum to determine.
72 only this interpretation is in accordance with both the wording of Articles 12, 96 cISG (which provide that the cISG's freedom of form provisions do 'not apply', rather than entitling a reservation State to declare that his own form requirements do apply) and with the convention's drafting history, during which the contrary construction was discussed, but explicitly rejected.
73 courts from Austria, Belgium, Hungary, the netherlands and the russian Federation (among them two Supreme courts) have taken the approach advocated here. 74 In practical terms, this means that the principle of freedom of form may still apply in accordance with Article 11 CISG if the applicable conflict of law rules point to the law of a cISG contracting State which has not made a reservation under Article 96 cISG. 75 Only if the forum's conflict of laws rules call for the application of The drafters of Articles 92 and 93 cISG described the effect of these reservations comparatively clearly by stipulating that a reserving State 'is not to be considered a contracting State' (Article 92(2) cISG) resp. that a party's place of business 'is considered not to be in a contracting State, unless it is in a territorial unit to which the convention extends' (Article 93(3) cISG): The general language used makes clear that this effect has to be observed by courts in any State (and not only reserving States), thus creating an erga omnes effect. 77 In this author's opinion, the same must hold true for reservations under Article 94 cISG, their effect being that the convention 'is not to on a practical level, it is not entirely surprising to see that courts in non-reserving States are generally more likely to ignore a reservation's effect than courts in reserving States: While no cases have been reported in which a court intentionally refused to observe a 'foreign' Article 92, 93 or 94 cISG-reservation, a number of courts have in the past overlooked reservations made by other contracting States 79 (despite the fact that these are listed in every list of contracting States). Much seems therefore to depend on how well the parties are represented during the court proceedings, as a simple reference to the fact that a party has its place of business in a reserving State will often suffice to bring the reservation's effect to bear in a foreign court.
aRTIcle 95 cIsg
The interpretation of Article 95 CISG raises more difficult problems. After the final text of the Convention had been adopted, it soon became obvious that commentators were divided when it came to the question if an Article 95 cISG declaration is of any relevance in courts of a non-reserving State. The ensuing academic discussion, which continues until today, centers around the following question: Which law of sales does the court in a non-Article 95 cISG-reserving State have to apply to a contract of sale, when at least one of the parties to that contract does not have its place of business in a contracting State (meaning that Article 1(1)(a) cISG cannot apply) and the forum's private international law rules (which the court then has to resort to under Ar- ticle 1(1)(b) cISG) point to the law of an Article 95 cISG-reserving State? A significant number of authors believe that the reference of its conflict rules to the law of a reserving State should lead the court to apply the same sales law as the courts in the reserving State would, ie not the cISG. 81 The Federal republic of Germany has supported this approach by way of an interpretative declaration (to be discussed in more detail below). 82 In doing so, this school of thought declares the Article 95 cISG reservation of a contracting State to be, at least to a certain extent, binding on other contracting States.
It is submitted that this interpretation of Article 95 cISG is at odds both with the wording of the provision and with a systematic comparison with Articles 92-94 cISG: By allowing each contracting State to declare that it will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG, Article 95 CISG clearly specifies that other contracting States will continue to be bound by Article 1(1)(b) cISG even when the sales contract at hand involves a party from a reserving State. In striking contrast to Articles 92(2), 93(3) and 94 (2) It is interesting to note that in the only German court decision in which such a situation has ever arisen, the oberlandesgericht düsseldorf (Germany), 2 June 1993, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (1993), 845, available at: http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/930702g1.html adopted the opposite approach: The case involved a contract between a seller from Indiana (uSA) and a buyer from Germany, with the contract having been concluded at a time when Germany had not yet ratified the cISG (which meant that, according to Article 100 cISG, the convention could not be applied by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) cISG). The court of Appeals instead looked to Article 1(1)(b) cISG, ruled that the German rules of private international law lead to the application of the law at the seller's place of business (ie Indiana) and held that the cISG applied. 
Temporal Scope of Effect: When does the Reservation's Effect Commence and Lapse?
Generally speaking, a reservation under the convention takes effect either simultaneously with the entry into force of the convention for the reserving State or, if the reservation is only declared at a later stage (as possible under the 'at any time' wording of Articles 94 and 96 CISG), on the first day of the month following the expiration of six months after the date of its receipt by the depositary (Article 97(3) sentences 1 and 2 cISG). The reservation then remains effective until it is withdrawn in accordance with Article 97(4) cISG.
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A more complicated regime applies to reservations made in accordance with Article 94 cISG, as this reservation needs to be declared with respect to one or more other States with whom the reserving State shares 'closely related legal rules'. When both States are contracting States, the necessary declarations must be either 'jointly' or 'reciprocal' (Article 94(1) cISG); 89 if only one of the States concerned has ratified the CISG, a declaration by the Contracting State suffices (Article 94(2) CISG). The need for a concertated action that is inherent in Article 94 cISG may result in an unexpected lapse of a reservation's effect, as the example of Iceland demonstrates: When it had not yet ratified the CISG, Iceland had been the subject of Article 94(2)-reservations by denmark, Finland, norway or Sweden, with whom Iceland shares a closely related sales law. upon its accession to the convention, 90 Iceland failed to make any declarations in accordance with Article 94(3) cISG (a requirement that probably had been overlooked by the responsible officials), which caused the existing reservations to lose effect and the Convention tosurprisingly -apply between Iceland and its Scandinavian neighbour States Finally, the temporal scope of a reservation's effect may also be affected in cases involving a succession of States. related questions will be discussed below in the section dealing with the succession of States and territories.
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Unclear Reservations (and How to Avoid Them) even when properly construed, any reservation to a uniform law convention by definition reduces the degree of uniformity achieved and may render the convention's practical application more difficult. Article 98 CISG implicitly acknowledges this fact by providing that 'no reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in this convention', thereby limiting the States' general 'freedom of contract' under public international law 93 and, at the same time, trying to reduce the number and content of reservations that courts and arbitrators may have to deal with.
A particular difficulty (and one not directly addressed by Article 98 cISG) arises when a contracting State makes an unclear reservation.
The Armenian Declaration
The convention's more recent history provides the following example. When depositing its instrument of accession to the cISG with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Article 91(4) CISG) in 2006, Armenia initially filed the following declaration: 'Pursuant to Article 94, paragraph 1 and 2 of the convention on contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the republic of Armenia declares that the convention shall not apply to contracts of What seems clear from the wording of the declaration is that the republic of Armenia attempted to formulate a 'reservation' in the sense defined by Article 2(1)(d) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, ie a 'unilateral statement […] made by a State […] whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State'. Beyond this, Armenia's declaration neither conformed to the wording of Article 94 (1), (2) cISG nor the general spirit of a reservation allowed under this provision, and its possible meaning remains uncertain. In this particular case, the declaration's lack of clarity remained without practical consequences, as the republic of Armenia apparently withdrew its declaration of accession before the cISG could enter into force for Armenia.
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The risk of making unclear reservations is, however, general in nature, as demonstrated by the fact that the People's republic of china also made a reservation under the cISG which lacks clarity:
95 Although the wording of china's declaration resembles an Article 96 cISG reservation, its language is not as encompassing because it only refers to Article 11 cISG, but neither mentions Article 29 cISG nor Part II of the convention. According to Article 2(1)(g) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, a 'party' to a treaty is a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force -at that point, and only at that point, is the State bound by the treaty (Aust Modern Treaty Law supra fn 19 at p 75). commentators convincingly argue that there is no reason why a withdrawal of an instrument of accession which has been deposited with the depositary of a multilateral treaty cannot be done, provided that the withdrawal occurs before the instrument takes effect (see id at p 95-96). According to Article 99(2) cISG, the convention only enters into force in respect of an acceding State on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of accession -thus, the withdrawal by Armenia seems to have been effectuated in a timely manner. At the time of writing, the republic of Armenia is not listed as a contracting State to the cISG. 95 declaration made by the People's republic of china upon approval of the convention on 11 december 1986.
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The declaration's wording is (partially) reproduced infra in the next paragraph.
How to Avoid Unclear Reservations
Against this background, it constitutes a desirable goal to develop procedures designed to avoid potential unclarities. As a starting point, two steps come to mind: First, is seems advisable for the States to keep the content of their reservations to the necessary minimum, and to refrain from repeating the text of reservation provisions from which, according to Article 98 cISG, they are not free to derogate. A reservation reading 'State X makes a declaration in accordance with Article 96' is thus preferable to 'State X does not consider itself to be bound by Article 11 as well as the provisions in the convention relating to the content of Article 11': 97 numbers are, in short, preferable to words. As a second measure, uncITrAL (or a similar institution) could make model reservations available to the contracting States, enabling them to use model wordings developed by experts when formulating a reservation under a uniform law convention.
Interpretation of Unclear Reservations by the Courts
In cases in which an unclear reservation has been made, it will be up to the courts and arbitrators to interpret the respective reservation in order to determine its effect upon the convention's application to the case at hand. In doing so, it is submitted that Article 31(1) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties in conjunction with Article 98 cISG provide an important interpretative guideline: When read together, these two treaty provisions indicate that all reservations should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms used therein and thus, in the light of the object and purpose of Article 98 cISG, should be construed as invoking Articles 92-96 cISG (only) in accordance with the respective reservation's prerequisites and effect as laid down in these Final Provisions.
In accordance with this interpretative guideline, the People's republic of china's declaration pertaining to form requirements should be read as not only covering Article 11 cISG, but also the convention's other provisions allowing for an oral or implicit conclusion, modification or termination of trade that Article 90 CISG had specifically been drafted to cover. 100 A possible reason might have been that Professor Gyula eörsi, who had acted as a member of the Hungarian delegation to the Vienna diplomatic conference and, enjoying an excellent reputation and high respect within the international academic community, had also served as the President of the conference, had written in a 1983 article that 'the trade law among coMecon countries inter se is unified and will remain unaffected by virtue of Art. 94 of the convention'.
101 This may have alerted Hungarian officials to the fact that the most prominent Hungarian expert on the cISG apparently did not concur with the view that saw the Gdc cMeA covered by Article 90 cISG.
The interpretation of Article 90 cISG favoured by Hungary in its interpretative declaration turned out to be in conformity with the view adopted by the majority of international commentators 102 and by a number of arbitral tribunals, which considered the (closely related) General Principles of deliveries between the Soviet union and the Peoples' republic of china to be subject to Article 90 cISG.
103 As far as can be ascertained, no Hungarian court ever addressed the applicability of Article 90 cISG to the Gdc cMeA, nor is there any indication that courts in other countries have taken note of Hungary's interpretative declaration. 
The German Declaration on Articles 1(1)(b) and 95 CISG
The Federal republic of Germany made the following declaration when acceding to the convention: 'The Government of the Federal republic of Germany holds the view that Parties to the convention that have made a declaration under article 95 of the convention are not considered contracting States within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of article 1 of the Convention. Accordingly, there is no obligation to apply -and the Federal Republic of Germany assumes no obligation to apply -this provision when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Party that has made a declaration to the effect that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1) (b) of article 1 of the convention. Subject to this observation the Government of the Federal republic of Germany makes no declaration under article 95 of the convention.'
As is clear from its last sentence, the statement cited was neither meant to constitute a reservation in accordance with Article 95 cISG nor a 'partial' reservation, 104 but an interpretative declaration. 105 In its declaration, the Government of the Federal republic of Germany 'interpreted' both Articles 1(1) (b) and 95 cISG in a particular manner and thus chose to take a position in a dispute which -as has been noted above -continues until today. In this context, it is not without interest to remember that the German delegation to the Vienna diplomatic conference had vigorously criticized both Articles 1(1) (b) and 95 cISG, but had eventually failed in its attempts to have the provisions removed from the convention's text.
Legal Significance of Interpretative Declarations
The cISG's Final Provisions do not address interpretative declarations. Their legal significance is therefore subject to the applicable standards of public international law.
107 Although a clear view or practice in this matter has not emerged, 108 it is beyond dispute that an interpretative declaration may not be made where such a declaration is prohibited by the treaty it is relating to. This is precisely the situation under the cISG: While interpretative declarations are not contrary to Article 98 cISG, 109 it is submitted that they are incompatible with Article 7(1) cISG, 110 as this provision declares an internationally uniform interpretation to be the cISG's decisive goal and, even more important, delegates the task of developing the convention's interpretation to the courts and not the government or parliament of the individual contracting States.
111 Article 7(1) cISG accordingly prohibits contracting States from influencing the Convention's interpretation through interpretative declarations. Any interpretative declaration that is made nevertheless must therefore remain without legal effect. tary any power to adjudicate on the declaration's validity or its legal effect.
114
In addition, the fact that all other contracting States remained silent in the face of the Hungarian and the German interpretative declarations is similarly without relevance: Article 20(5) convention on the Law of Treaties is inapplicable as it is only concerned with reservations, and there is no duty to respond to interpretative declarations under general international law.
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Inaction can accordingly not be treated as aquiescence, and does not cure the declarations' legal insignificance.
Interpretative Declarations and Interpretative Domestic Legislation
Finally, some contracting States have enacted domestic laws which purport to interpret certain provisions of the cISG. Legislation of this kind can eg be found in canada, 116 Germany 117 and norway. 118 unlike the 'interpretative declarations' discussed above, these cases of interpretative domestic legislation have not been communicated to the depositary of the convention, and their content has therefore not even been brought to the other contracting States' attention. According to the applicable rules of public international law, interpretative domestic legislation is of no legal significance to other contracting States and their courts, which are therefore not only entitled to disregard its content, but are even obliged to do so because of their obligation to apply the convention's rules in accordance with Article 7(1) cISG.
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As Article 7(1) cISG has to be observed by every contracting State, those contracting States which have prescribed a certain interpretation by way of an interpretative domestic legislation are arguably acting in violation of public international law. This is certainly the case if the content of the interpretative domestic legislation departs from the prevailing international See Ziegel 'canada Prepares to Adopt' supra fn 116 at 11. interpretation of the cISG provisions concerned, given that Article 27 Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties explictly provides that '[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty'.
120 But Article 7(1) cISG, it is submitted, should be read as going even further: Any domestic act which requires courts to follow a national legislator's view when interpreting the convention should be regarded as a violation of the contracting State's obligations arising from the convention, even if the cISG's interpretation laid down in the interpretative domestic legislation should be in accordance with the internationally prevailing view.
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SucceSSIon oF STATeS And THe cISG
The Succession of States 122 is a phenomenon that has gained some importance for the convention's applicability, in particular through its impact upon certain territories' status as 'contracting States' under the cISG. Since the CISG's Final Provisions provide no specific rules addressing these developments, recourse has to be had to rules of customary public international law. The definition of those rules is, however, unfortunately difficult, 123 as only some of the provisions in the Vienna convention on Succession of States in 120 This raises the following question: Are the courts in States which have enacted an interpretative domestic legislation free to depart from the domestic law in favour of an international interpretative approach? The matter has to be decided in accordance with the respective constitutional law, and cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that at least one commentator has argued that German courts are not bound by domestic interpretative law in this situation, but should follow Article 7(1) cISG; see Magnus Kommentar supra fn 40 at Art 1 para 111.
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Cf Hagstrøm 'CISG -Implementation in Norway' supra fn 118 at 247.
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See Brownlie, I (1998) Principles of Public International Law (5th ed) oxford university Press at p 650: 'It is of great importance to note that the phrase "state succession" is employed to describe an area, or a source of problems: the term does not connote any principle or presumption that a transmission or succession of legal rights and duties occurs.' 
Uniform Law in a World of Shifting Borders
Soon after the cISG had entered into force on 1 January 1988, the world entered a new era that was marked by significant changes on the global political landscape: Within a couple of years, a number of States that had participated in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference of 1980 and had subsequently ratified the Sales convention would cease to exist, new States would be established in their place and again others would encounter changes in their borders.
The first change in the fledgling CISG landscape was caused by the German reunification on 3 October 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (then already a cISG contracting State) acceeded to the Federal republic of Germany (at that stage still a non-contracting State). 125 In 1991, the union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) -for which the CISG entered into force on 1 September that year -began to dissolve, and a significant number of independent States emerged, which among them adopted a variety of positions towards the convention (see below). The Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia, which had been a cISG contracting State since 1 January 1988, similarly underwent significant changes, when from 1991 onwards most of its republics declared their independence. The cISG entered into force for the Federal republic of Germany on 1 January 1991.
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The cISG had entered into force for the cSSr on 1 April 1991.
Kong -which since 1842 had been a British crown colony, and therefore part of a Non-Contracting State -was restored to the People's Republic of China (a cISG contracting State), and on 20 december 1999 a similar development finally took place with respect to Macao, which for centuries had been administered by Portugal (another non-contracting State).
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Effect of State successions upon the Status as a CISG 'Contracting State'
In determining the legal effect that a State succession (as the ones described above) may have upon the affected territories' status as a cISG 'contracting State', a number of different scenarios need to be distinguished:
Dissolution and Separation of States
When a part or parts of the territory of a contracting State for which the cISG is in force separate to form one or more States (as in case of the uSSr, the former Yugoslavia and the cSSr), two possible, but mutually exclusive principles may apply: According to the 'continuity principle', the convention would automatically continue in force in respect of each successor State so formed. Articles 34(1)(a), 35 Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties are based on the assumption that this 'continuity principle' constitutes the general rule. According to the 'clean-slate principle', on the contrary, the Convention ratified by the predecessor State would only become binding upon the successor State once the latter has filed a formal notification of succession. Although this approach has been codified in Articles separation from a predecessor State which continues to exist ('separation' or 'cession' as opposed to complete 'dismembration' or 'dissolution').
130 When applied to rights and obligations arising from the cISG, the principles just mentioned lead to the following results:
No practical difficulties arise whenever a successor State's status as a Contracting State is being supported through a notification of succession which the successor State files with the treaty's depositary. With respect to the cISG, this step was taken by the russian Federation (successor to the uSSr, and continuing its international legal personality), Belarus (successor to the Byelorussian SSr), the ukraine (successor to the ukrainian SSr), the czech republic and the Slovak republic (successors to the cSSr), Bosnia and Herzegovina, croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia (adopting the name 'The former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia') (successors to the Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia, the so-called 'former Yugoslavia'), as well as the republic of Serbia and the republic of Montenegro (successors to Serbia and Montenegro, a State which -under the then name of 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' -had also been a successor to the 'former Yugoslavia' 131 ). While the legal certainty created by the notification procedure is only too welcome, it is worth remembering that, from a dogmatic point of view, the contracting State status of the above mentioned States arguably arose ipso iure because of the 'continuity principle': Their notifications of succession were therefore purely declaratory in nature, 132 merely confirming a situation which, by international law, already existed. The Federal republic of Yugoslavia had been created in 1992 and claimed to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, to which the former republics now independent -see above -objected.
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note that, according to Article 9 Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, a unilateral notification of succession by a successor State alone does not suffice in order to transfer the rights and duties under a treaty.
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A difference between a notification of succession establishing the Contracting State status and a notification (unnecessarily) conforming it would only arise as far as the period between the date of succession and the notification of succession is concerned: However, this difference is being removed whenever a notification of succession declares the convention retroactively applicable.
Another group of successor States refrained from filing a notice of succession, and instead selected to ratify the cISG themselves. This approach was adopted by a significant number of States whose territories previously formed part of the uSSr, namely estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and uzbekistan. 134 It is in accordance with what seems to be the prevailing view with respect to the legal situation of the former Soviet republics, which -apart from the Russian Federation, which continued the uSSr (Article 35 Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties) -are considered to have inhereted a 'clean slate'.
135 Their position as a cISG contracting State was therefore established by acceding to the convention de novo in their own name.
Finally, a number of States whose territory previously formed part of the USSR -Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tjikistan and Turkmenistan 136 -neither deposited an instrument of accession with the depositary of the cISG in accordance with Article 91(3), (4) CISG, nor made a notification of succession establishing their succession to the uSSr's rights and obligations arising from the CISG. These former Soviet republics -who, in short, simply remained silent -can therefore currently not be considered 'Contracting States' under the cISG, as the 'clean slate principle' governing their position removed the legal nexus between the convention and their respective territories.
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Territory of a State Becoming Part of Another State
A somewhat different development takes place when a certain territory (within which sellers or buyers may reside) and which, under public inter-
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As mentioned above, Armenia also filed an instrument of accession in 2006, but apparently withdrew it.
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Brownlie Principles of Public International Law supra fn 122 at p 664; Gamarra 'current Questions' supra fn 123 at 419; Korman, ST (1992) The first development to be considered involves a Contracting State (or part thereof) becoming part of a non-contracting State. This happened when the German democratic republic, which had been a cISG contracting State since 1 March 1990, effective 3 october 1990 acceded to the Federal republic of Germany (at that time still a non-contracting State, as the convention only entered into force for the Federal republic of Germany on 1 January 1991). Generally speaking, upon becoming part of the territory of another State, treaties of the predecessor State cease to be in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates, as provided by Article 15(a) Vienna convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties. As the German reunification was marked by a number of unique circumstances, 138 commentators are divided if this solution also applies to eastern Germany's status under the cISG between 3 october 1990 and 1 January 1991.
139 Suffice it to say that the point has not gained any practical relevance, as no international sales contract concluded by an eastern German party during this brief period has been reported that would have raised the question of the convention's applicability.
The reverse situation occured when on 1 July 1997 the territory of Hong Kong -which was at that point a British crown colony, and therefore part of a CISG non-Contracting State -was restored to the People's Republic of china (a cISG contracting State), and when on 20 december 1999 a similar development took place with respect to Macao, which for centuries had been administered by Portugal (another non-contracting State provides that the successor State shall be considered as maintaining any reservation which was applicable at the date of the succession of States, unless it expressly states otherwise. Although Articles 30-38 Vienna convention lack a similar provision, it is submitted that the same must apply to other cases of State succession, as the 'continuity principle' is based on the very idea that the predecessor's scope of treaty obligations survives the succession unchanged.
146 As a result, the reservation according to Article 95 cISG is still effective for the czech and the Slovac republic.
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THe conVenTIon'S reLATIonSHIP WITH oTHer InTernATIonAL InSTruMenTS: ArTIcLeS 90, 94 cISG And euroPeAn coMMunITY LAW A most difficult question relating to the position of the CISG within the international legal order is raised by the developing 'regionalisation' of international business law: 148 Which rules should govern the relationship between the convention on one hand and instruments adopted by regional communities of States on the other hand in case these instruments apply to international contracts subject to the cISG, but provide for solutions that differ from those used in the Convention? Such a 'conflict of norms' between two international instruments is currently most likely to occur between the cISG and instruments adopted by the european community, as the vast majority of its Member States have also ratified the CISG. The European Community legislation in force already contains a number of provisions not in harmony with the convention, amongst others in the consumer Sales directive, 153 or Decisiones adopted by the Mercado comun del Sur (MercoSur).
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The cISG's Part IV contains two provisions designed to govern the convention's relationship with concurrent international instruments (' Relationsnormen' 155 ), namely Article 90 cISG and Article 94 cISG. They differ both in their scope of application and in their legal effect: While Article 90 cISG merely applies to 'international agreements' concluded by contracting States, but accords prevalence to any of those agreements without requiring any specific action by a State involved, Article 94 CISG accommodates any instrument that introduces the same or closely related legal rules into the participating States' legal systems, but does require explicit declarations of While the Acte uniforme sur le droit commercial général the oHAdA adopted on 17 April 1997 is largely based on the cISG, it does contain a number of potentially conflicting provisions; see Schroeter, UG (2001) 'Das einheitliche Kaufrecht der oHAdA-Staaten' Law in Africa 163 at 167. That a conflict with the CISG must currently seem unlikely is due to the fact that among the oHAdA States only Gabon and Guinea have adopted the convention.
On conflicts between such acts and international conventions in general see Basedow, J (2003) 'Worldwide Harmonisation of Private Law and regional economic Integration -General Report' Uniform Law Review 31 at 38; specifically on conflicts with the CISG see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 9 para 41. 155 on this German legal term, see Schroeter UN-Kaufrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra fn 8 at § 7 paras 27-30.
At the time of writing, no declaration under Article 94 cISG in favor of european community law has been made, and the prevalence of the convention accordingly stands. When thinking about the future of the convention, one might contemplate a future accession not only by other States, but also by regional or international organisations. Such a step, which has already been advocated by commentators with a view to a possible accession of the european community to the cISG, 161 raises the interesting question if the Final Provisions of the cISG allow for the membership of an international entity as the european community or, for example, the oHAdA.
The relevant provision is Article 91(3) cISG, which provides that the convention 'is open for accession by all States which are not signatory States as from the date it is open for signature'. This so-called 'all-states clause' is in accordance with Article 6 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, which addresses the related issue of each State's capacity to conclude treaties. At the time of its adoption in 1980, Article 91(3) cISG was considered a liberal clause, as comparable provisions in older conventions had often stated that only Member States of the un or of one of its special agencies could become contracting States, 162 thereby excluding accession by States that were not internationally recognized and, for that matter, by international organizations.
The wording of Article 91(3) cISG as it stands, however, still only provides for an accession of 'States' to the convention. The european com-160 cf also Article 307(2) ec Treaty. munity, on the other hand, clearly does not constitute a State in the sense employed by public international law, which, according to some authors, suffices to effectively bar an accession of the European Community. 163 The better reasons, it is submitted, militate in favor of a more flexible interpretation of Article 91(3) cISG, which would also be in accordance with the practice that has developed in the application of this treaty provision (cf Article 31(3)(b) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties): The fact that the uSSr became a contracting State at a time when the Byelorussian SSr and the Ukrainian SSR -which formed part of the USSR, but had both not been recognized as sovereign by most States 164 -were already Contracting States to the cISG in their own right, aptly demonstrates that political factors have always played a significant role within the interpretation of Article 91(3) CISG. The wording of this final provision thus does not necessarily prevent an accession by the european community.
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More important problems are raised by the application of Article 1(1)(a) cISG in constellations involving international organizations: As this central provision requires the parties to have their places of business in different contracting States, the legal status of the european community as one contracting State would result in all intra-Community contracts failing to fulfill the requirements of Article 1(1)(a) CISG -all EU companies would suddenly be based within one and the same contracting State. 166 The application of Article 1(1)(a) cISG to international organizations comprising several States which, in their own right, also qualify as contracting States under the convention, does therefore not correspond to the cISG's sphere of applicability, and would create significant legal uncertainty. It is submitted that the reason The present article has tried to demonstrate that the cISG's 'Final Provisions', although routinely neglected by commentators, often play an important role in the convention's application. The existing case law on Articles 89-101 cISG shows that courts and arbitral tribunals have generally been able to handle the difficulties that the interpretation of 'Part IV' occasionally presents, and that -with one notable exception 168 -the goal of an internationally uniform interpretation (Article 7(1) cISG) has largely been achieved. Apart from the role they play within the cISG's everyday application, the Convention's 'Final Provisions' have yet a different purpose to fulfil: They provide the framework that will determine if the convention, as it is growing older, has the necessary flexibility to adapt to the legal and political changes that the future may hold. Insofar, Part IV may indeed be described as the Convention's 'backbone': Like every backbone, it sustains and gives firmness to the entire body (of the cISG), and as long as it is being treated with care, one might almost be tempted to forget it exists.
